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This work project estimates price-cost margins for 163 Portuguese markets (defined at 3-digit 
level of CAE), with the aim of assessing the degree of product market competition. During 
the Economic and Financial Assistance Program of 2011-14, a set of product market reforms 
was implemented, with the objective of increasing competition in output markets. We provide 
a first assessment of the effectiveness of these reforms. We use Portuguese firm-level data to 
estimate price-cost margins, allowing for worker’s bargaining power. By then aggregating 
markets into sectors, our results allow us to conclude that the degree of competition did 













“The entrepreneur is the one who first sees its economic viability, bucks the odds, fights or worms his way into 
the market, and eventually wins or loses. (...) In the course of this process, which cannot possibly run smoothly, 
many businesses, individuals, and institutions will be undermined and swept away. Schumpeter called this 
process creative destruction, and realized before anyone else that it was the main source of economic growth.” 
Solow, Robert. 2007. Heavy Thinker. The New Republic May 2007, 48-50. 
 
1. Motivation and Introduction 
During the course of April 2011 and motivated by an unbearable pressure on fiscal 
sustainability, Portugal publicly requested external financial help. In return for immediate 
financial relief, Portugal agreed to comply on what was named the Memorandum of 
Understanding- a document listing specific policies and economic goals, particularly of a 
structural nature, to be implemented and expected to impact positively in the output market
1
. 
In this regard, provided the economic contraction Portugal undergone between 2010 and 
2013, it is extremely relevant to simultaneously assess and monitor the economic effects of 
new policies. As part of the Ministry of the Economy, the Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos 
(G.E.E.) has a public role in the monitoring of economic indicators
2
. This work project was 
developed during a 3-month internship program at the G.E.E, in close cooperation with some 
of its members and carried out under the guidance of Professor Ana Gouveia
3
. The topic of 
the work project was motivated by the interest of the Ministry of the Economy in studying 
competition within the Portuguese Economy. All data used in this paper and the working 
conditions necessary to develop it were provided by the G.E.E. 
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Shortly, the work aims at presenting an empirical assessment on the degree of competition in 
the product market of the Portuguese Economy, for the period between 2010 and 2013. In 
addition, this work project is a tool that will allow the continuous monitoring of the 
Portuguese Economy, as the methodology is now at the disposal of both the G.E.E and the 
G.P.E.A.R.I, the two offices of the Ministries of the Economy and Finance, respectively, in 
charge of economic analysis. Such contribution is intended to overcome the problem that “the 
lack of a comprehensive and systematic approach to monitoring and evaluation makes it 
difficult to assess the full impact of reforms on the functioning of the economy”
4
. 
The body of the paper consists in the Literature Review present in Section 2. Section 3 
presents a brief description of the macroeconomic context of the Portuguese Economy, during 
the considered time period. The methodology and the variables are presented in Section 4 and 
5, respectively. Lastly, in Section 6, results are presented and discussed. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The degree of competition existent in product markets is an important part of the 
characterization of any economy. According to classic economic theory, the higher the 
competition in the product market, the more efficient is the allocation of resources within an 
economy – in the absence of market failures, perfect competition delivers an efficient 
allocation of resources. On the other hand, less competition leads to increased market power 
of firms operating within such markets. In fact, considerable market power allows firms to 
capture rents by practicing prices above marginal costs – generating equilibrium prices higher 
than those of perfect competition, thereby reducing the quantity exchanged in the market and 
inducing a loss in social welfare.  
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Moreover, entry in less competitive markets is far more difficult as incumbents may hold 
sufficient resources to fight entrants, thus preventing, at the same time, innovation and 
development. However, mark-ups by themselves do not depict entirely the state of 
competition within a market. In reality, several other factors need to be taken into account, 
such as the market structure, the number of firms or the products traded in the market. For 
instance, even within a context of extreme competition, firms may charge higher prices due to 
the degree of differentiation of their products – whether it is because of better quality or a 
more adequate target market.  
Nonetheless, the recent empirical literature has validated these theoretical developments, 
linking productivity growth with high degrees of competition, particularly for developed 
economies
5
. According to Syverson (2011), competition drives productivity through two key 
mechanisms: (1) intramarket competition and (2) trade competition. We focus on the former, 
taking advantage of the availability of firm-level data
6
. 
As previously mentioned, defining robust measures of competition is a strong challenge both 
theoretical and empirically – and every attempt comes with its caveats. In principal, the most 
common way is to measure the degree of concentration of production in relevant markets – 
however, the premise that a small number of competitors suggest lack of competition is 
debatable, particularly for some types of market structures
7
. Alternatively, the turnover of 
firms for a particular sector is sometimes used as an indicator of competition – still, such 
approach does not take into account the size of firms that enter and leave the market
8
.  
This paper relies on the direct estimation of price-cost margins. Whilst prices are easy to 
measure, the difficulty lies on the fact that marginal costs are not directly observed. Despite 
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being measurable individually by firms, these lack proper incentives to do so and even less to 
report them afterwards. Notwithstanding, considerable empirical research has been directed 
on this topic using structural econometric models to overcome these measurement issues. 
One of the first empirical approaches to the estimation of price-cost margins was proposed in 
Hall (1988). The methodology was based on the relation between the Solow residual (SR) and 
the growth rate of inputs
9
. A major drawback is the endogeneity present in the model which 
prevents the possibility of estimation using standard econometric tools. In fact, input growth 
rates should be correlated with technological progress which, in turn, is not observable. In 
order to address this issue, Hall proposed the use of instrumental variables. Nonetheless, 
finding adequate instruments is a severe challenge and the ones selected were of doubtful 
validity. Alternatively, other literature suggests different responses such as the use of a 
control function as proposed in Olley and Pakes (1996) or a more exhaustive estimation by 
generalized method of moments to guarantee consistency as in Dobbelaere (2004). 
As a response to the aforementioned problem, in Roeger (1995) an alternative methodology is 
proposed, consisting in the use of the difference between the Solow residuals obtained from 
the problem of profit maximization and that from the cost minimization (the dual problem) of 
the firm. By doing so, the source of endogeneity is eliminated as the technological parameters 
cross out
10
. The standard version of Roeger’s methodology assumes constant returns to scale, 
homogeneous inputs and perfectly competitive input markets (for capital, labour and 
intermediate inputs). Notwithstanding, the validity of such assumptions is debatable. 
Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that market power is significantly underestimated 
when the degree of imperfection of the labour market is ignored, as will be made clear in our 
subsequent analysis. In this regard, contributions from Crépon et al. (2005) and Abraham et 
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al. (2009), which take into account imperfect competition in the labour market, allow for the 
computation of more consistent estimates.  
The methodology used in this paper is similar to the one used Amador and Soares (2013) and 
also uses the same database. Given that this paper uses data from 2010 to 2013, it can be 
viewed as an extension of Amador and Soares (2013) – which uses data from 2005 to 2009
11
.  
It is also worth noticing that the use of a production function framework which allows 
capturing some of the differences between technologies across sectors is particularly relevant 
in a context where a large number of markets are covered, as the present one. 
 
3. Portuguese Economic Conjuncture  
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, abrupt output shocks widely spread 
amongst European Union member states. At first, EU response came in an expansionary form, 
as policymakers opted to try to boost growth and contain employment destruction via 
government spending. However, at this moment in time, some of these countries already held 
very high debt to GDP ratios. Hence, further accumulation of fiscal deficits after the crisis 
deteriorated sovereigns’ credibility and pushed secondary market yields through the roof, 
causing debt servicing to be too costly to bear – and subsequent request for external financial 
help
12
. From here, the focus of EU economic policy changed to the correction of structural 
imbalances, for the countries where it applied.  
In the case of Portugal, in addition to a primary fiscal deficit, there was a negative current 
account balance, as displayed in Figure 1.  
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                     Source: OECD 
 Shortly, European economic policy priorities started to be based on the following three 
pillars: (1) investment; (2) fiscal responsibility; (3) structural reforms
13
. Typical structural 
reforms can be divided into four fields: (1) product market; (2) labour market; (3) public 
sector; (4) financial sector, generally including policies that make labour markets more 
flexible and responsive, liberalise service sectors, enhance competition in product markets, 
improve the overall business environment and encourage innovation.  
In this regard, the fact that several Euro Area countries – not only those which undergone 
assistance programmes – have been implementing product market reforms simultaneously 
ought to be beneficial for the overall objective of boosting growth in Europe. The question of 
the synchronization in reforming between countries is modelled by the IMF (2006)
14
, 
considering only Euro Area member states.  
Particularly, product market reforms are of a microeconomic nature and aim to improve the 
functioning of markets by increasing competition amongst producers (of goods and services) 
and, consequently, improving their respective productivity growth. It is worth noticing that 
most product market reforms have no considerable budgetary impact – they can consist 
simply in reducing red tape or, for instance, improving the swiftness of licensing 
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Figure 1 - Evolution of Current Account Balance and Sovereign Deficit, Portugal 
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requirements. Yet, these reforms seem to be unpopular given the time they need to accrue 
tangible effects – additionally, the potential effects are spread across the economy as a whole, 
while the cost remain, in general, concentrated. 
Given the need for a fast response to the official institutions requests and because structural 
reforms take time to accrue real effects, the Portuguese government resorted to immediate 
policy measures – in general, freezing collective bargaining and tampering wages (refocusing 
on exports via labour price decrease), cutting social benefits and social services (to balance 
the budget), whilst privatizing public assets (in order to repay debt)
15
.  
Table 1 - Real GDP growth, Portugal 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Real GDP growth (% of GDP) -3.0 1.90 -1.83 -4.03 -1.13 
                              Source: OECD 
It is clear from Table 1 that between 2011 and 2013 there was a recession. In fact, total 
Employment steadily diminished and, consequently, so did Gross Value Added, as displayed 
in Figure 2. At the same time, an even greater shock affected overall Investment, which may 





                     
                                         Source: Eurostat and World Bank 
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Regarding firm demographics (Table 2), the scenario was similar. Between 2010 and 2012, 
the number of firms steadily decreased – there was a recovery in 2013, but for a level below 
that of 2011. For the entire period, the mortality rate is over 15 p.p. – meaning that for 100 
existent firms, at least 15 close during the year – signalling harsh economic conditions. In this 
context, mark-ups can be very relevant if we consider higher mark-ups to be beneficial for 
firms’ balance sheets – as it would induce firms trying to stay afloat to practice higher prices. 
Table 2 - Firm demographics, Portugal 
Portuguese Firms 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Natality Rate (%) 11,8 12,7 12,4 17,9 
Mortality Rate (%) 15,2 16,0 17,9 17,0 
Total number of firms 1.168.265 1.136.256 1.086.915 1.119.447 
                     Source: Eurostat 
3.1 Product Market Reforms in Portugal 
According to the IMF Country Report on Portugal, 152 product market reforms to be 
implemented were identified - these reforms are expected to impact in 10 economic areas and 
pursue 20 objectives.  
The present work is not based on the study of a particular reform but rather an overall 
assessment of competition, which is itself a result of the regulatory framework. The effects 
generated by the implementation of product market reforms take time to accrue but are 
expected to impact positively on competition and output. Even though a full account of all the 
reforms in details is out of the scope of this work, a shortened but comprehensive list of the 




Table 3 - Summary of Product Market Reforms’ goals for Portugal (IMF) 
Area Objectives 
Licensing environment 
Reduce administrative burdens; Improve the licensing 
regimes and reduce approval timings; Foster urban renewal 
Energy costs 
Liberalization of the electricity and gas markets; Ensure 
sustainability of the national electric system;  
Costs of telecommunications 
and postal services 
Increase competition in the market by lowering entry 
barriers; Strengthen power of the National Regulator 
Authority 
Cost of road use 
Adopt strategic plan to rationalize networks and improve 
mobility and logistic conditions; Reduce the PPPs road 
costs 
Cost of using railways 
Strengthen competition in railway sector and attract more 
traffic 
Cost of using ports Reform the Port model to reduce cots in about 25-30 p.p. 
Cost of professional services 
Remove barriers to entry in key professional regulated 
professions to increase competition 
Cost of other services 
Reduce entry barriers to a wide range of service activities 
to increase competition 
Enforcement of competition 
Strengthen the powers of the competition authority and the 
sector regulators; Eliminate special rights of the state 
Housing market 
Boost rental market by revitalizing city centers; Foster 
labour mobility; Reduce incentives to household excessive 
debt 




4.  Methodology  
In essence, this paper uses the methodology put forward in Amador and Soares (2013). Both 
the source of information and the research theme are the same, hence the adaptation of the 
model used. In this Section, a step-by-step description of the methodology is presented, 
starting with Roeger’s approach, followed by the relaxation of the perfectly competitive 
labour market assumption, indispensable to ensure consistency. 
4.1 Mark-up estimation using Roeger’s approach 
The initial framework is a standard neoclassical production function: 
 𝑄 = 𝐴𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑀)                              (1) 
where 𝑄 stands for output, 𝐴 is the technological parameter (which is assumed to be Hicks-
neutral to ease the logarithmic differentiation) and 𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑀 represent the inputs (capital, labor 
and intermediate inputs, respectively). 
Within perfectly competitive input and output markets - profit maximizing firms have null 
market power - the productivity of each individual input can be replaced by its corresponding 
price (meaning that, for instance, output elasticity with respect to capital matches the share of 
capital in nominal output
16
). In that case, the Solow residual would equal the technological 
parameter 𝜃. This is not the case here as we intend to test the hypothesis of perfect 
competition in the output market.  
Contrastingly, in the presence of market power, the Solow residual no longer corresponds to 
the technological progress, implying that output elasticities no longer match the 
corresponding production shares. In fact, there is a markup ratio such that 𝑗 = 𝜇 𝛼𝑗, where 





≡ 𝛼𝑗, where 𝑃 is price of output and respective quantity 𝑄; 𝑃𝑗 is price of input with 𝐽 = 𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑀. 
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𝑗 stands for output elasticity with respect to input 𝑗, 𝜇 corresponds to the mark-up and 𝛼𝑗 
represents the share of input 𝑗 in output. In this this case, the growth rate of output – derived 
from Equation 1 - can be computed as follows: 
 Δ𝑞 = 𝜇(𝛼𝐾Δ𝑘 + 𝛼𝐿Δ𝑙 + 𝛼𝑀Δ𝑚) + 𝜃      (2) 
where Δ𝑞 represents the growth rate of output and 𝜃 is the technological parameter. 
In addition, assuming constant returns to scale
17
, the Solow residual is obtained as: 
 𝑆𝑅 = (1 −
1
𝜇
) (Δ𝑞 − Δ𝑘) +
1
𝜇
𝜃            (3) 
The last term is not observable (the technological parameter) which causes the OLS estimator 
to be inconsistent. Still, equation 3 allows us to obtain the classical price-cost margin as 






, where 𝑃 is price and 𝑀𝑔𝐶is marginal cost. Hence, the 
problem is directly related to the unobservable term only. 
In this regard, considering the dual problem of cost minimization given a level of output for 
the firm, it is possible to eliminate the technological parameter. Assuming the same as 
previously, the Solow residual of the dual problem can be computed as: 
 𝑆𝑅𝑑 ≡ Δ𝑝 − 𝛼𝐾Δ𝑟 + 𝛼𝐿Δ𝑤 + 𝛼𝑀Δ𝑝𝑚 = (1 −
1
𝜇
) (Δ𝑝 − Δ𝑟) −
1
𝜇
𝜃       (4) 
where 𝑝 is log of output price and 𝑟, 𝑤 and 𝑝𝑚 are cost of capital, wages and cost of 
intermediate inputs in log.   
The endogeneity source is eliminated by computing the difference between the Solow 
residuals: 
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 𝑆𝑅 − 𝑆𝑅𝑑 = (1 −
1
𝜇
) [(Δ𝑝 + Δ𝑞) − (Δ𝑟 + Δ𝑘)]     (5) 
Therefore, the inconsistency problem is solved and the estimation of the mark-up can be 
performed by OLS consistently
18
. Still, the estimation requires a firm-level computation of the 
cost of capital. 
4.2 Mark-up under imperfect labour market 
Previously, mark-ups were estimated assuming a perfectly competitive labor market where 
workers’ bargaining power is null. Nevertheless, not only this assumption is strongly 
contested by empirical evidence but also will cause the mark-up to be significantly 
underestimated. Given this, it is beneficial to change the empirical approach and take into 
account imperfect competition in the labor market
19
. Assuming that wages (𝑊) and number of 
workers (𝐿) are chosen simultaneously given an efficient bargaining problem involving the 
sharing of the surplus between the firm and workers: 
 max𝐿,𝑊 Ω = [(𝑊 − ?̅?)𝐿]
𝜙. (𝑃𝑄 − 𝑊𝐿)(1−𝜙)                        (6) 
where ?̅? is the reservation wage and 𝜙 represents the worker’s bargaining power (𝜙 = 0 
corresponds to a perfectly competitive labor market; 𝜙 = 1 represents the case where workers 
capture the entire surplus of the firm). Assuming a case of imperfect competition and an 
isoelastic demand for output, one can derive the elasticity of output with respect to labor as
20
: 
 𝐿 = 𝜇𝛼𝐿 + 𝜇
𝜙
1−𝜙
(𝛼𝐿 − 1)        (7) 
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−
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1
𝜂
 . For detailed derivation please refer to 
Amador and Soares (2013) Section 2.2. 
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Afterwards, the remaining output elasticities are adjusted, given the assumption of constant 
returns to scale. With the adjusted elasticities, the Solow residuals entail a new term and 
equation 5 can be rewritten as: 
 𝑆𝑅 − 𝑆𝑅𝑑 = (1 −
1
𝜇
) [(Δ𝑝 + Δ𝑞) − (Δ𝑟 + Δ𝑘)] +
𝜙
1−𝜙
(𝛼𝐿 − 1)[(Δ𝑙 + Δ𝑤) −
(Δ𝑟 + Δ𝑘)]             (8) 
From Equation 8, we derive Equation 9 which allows estimating the mark-up and the 
worker’s bargaining power jointly, improving the consistency of the mark-up estimate.  
𝑦𝑖,𝑗 =  𝛽1𝑥𝑖,𝑗
1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖,𝑗
2 + 𝑖,𝑗          (9) 




) and 𝜙, the mark-up and the bargaining power, respectively, for each 
individual market. In the benchmark case, the Equation is run for 163 markets, with an 
average of approximately 441 firms by market. The terms of Equation 9 are the following: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = (Δ𝑝𝑖,𝑗 + Δ𝑞𝑖,𝑗) − 𝛼
𝐿(Δ𝑙𝑖,𝑗 + Δ𝑤𝑖,𝑗) − 𝛼
𝑀(Δ𝑚𝑖,𝑗) − (1 − 𝛼
𝐿 − 𝛼𝑀)(Δ𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + Δ𝑘𝑖,𝑗),  
𝑥𝑖,𝑗
1 = [(Δ𝑝𝑖,𝑗 + Δ𝑞𝑖,𝑗) − (Δ𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + Δ𝑘𝑖,𝑗)]  
𝑥𝑖,𝑗
2 = (𝛼𝐿 − 1)[(Δ𝑙𝑖,𝑗 + Δ𝑤𝑖,𝑗) − (Δ𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + Δ𝑘𝑖,𝑗)],  
𝑖 = 2011, 2012,2013 and 𝑗 stands for firm.  
5. Database and Variables 
We use data from the annual accounts of Portuguese firms reported under Informação 
Simplificada Empresarial (IES) for the period 2010-2013. This immense database provides 




Still in line with the analysis from Amador and Soares (2013), we have eliminated 
observations with the following characteristics. To start, only firms reporting strictly positive 
sales, labor costs, intermediate inputs and net capital stock (tangible and intangible) were 
considered. As a means to exclude outliers, observations below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 
percentile in the distribution of growth rates of sales, labor costs, intermediate inputs and net 
capital stock were excluded. In addition, observations with depreciation rates and share of 
labor costs and intermediate inputs in total sales outside the [0,1] range were not considered.  
Moreover, to be consistent with profit-maximization in the long-rum, firms reporting negative 
operational results in at least two years were not considered. These poor performing firms 
represent a share of approximately 28%, as opposed to 22% for the period between 2005 and 
2009
21
. The increase is reasonable and can be attributable to the recession which resulted in 
the closing of several firms and in a severe increase in unemployment. This treatment is likely 
to increase the possibility of a sample selection bias – as one may be disregarding firms at an 
early stage/investment phase. Therefore, the impact of such bias is addressed with the use of 
the two-step Heckman procedure. Also, the sectors of “Agriculture”, “Education” and 
“Health” were withdrawn because of the relevance the government has on their functioning.  
Markets are defined at the 3-digit level in CAE Rev.3. This classification is different from the 
one present in Amador and Soares (2013), where the 3-digit level is used but from CAE 
Rev.1.1. Hence, market-to-market comparisons should be drawn carefully.  
After the treatment, the sample is composed by 79,357 firms in 2011, 71,361 in 2012 and 
65,366 in 2013. Overall, the benchmark case considers a total of 163 markets, where 113 are 
considered tradable and 50 non-tradable. The criterion used to distinguish between sectors is 
an adaption derived from the Work Project of Canas (2016), a research colleague at G.E.E. 
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Through a process of analyzing different criteria
22
 and sort out the differences they yield, 
Canas (2016) proposes a new set of tradable goods sectors
23
. This classification is 
substantially different from the most commonly used in institutional economic research and 
also from the one present in Amador and Soares (2013)
24
. However, in this work, sectors “D” 
and “J” were considered to be non-tradable, so as to trace better improvements from product 




The present structural econometric model requires the use of an extensive set of variables. To 
start with, output is represented by total sales from goods and services with growth rate equal 
to Δ𝑝 + Δ𝑞. At the same time, labour costs are represented by nominal wages and other 
benefits, with growth rate equal to Δ𝑙 + Δ𝑤.  
Additionally, shares of employment and intermediate inputs (𝛼𝐿 and 𝛼𝑀) are given by the 






Source: Author’s calculations 
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 Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Manufacturing, mining and quarrying; Electricity, gas and water; Transportation and 
Storage; Accommodation and food service activities; Information and communication; Financial and insurance activities; and 
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 “The set of tradable markets includes all manufacturing markets plus those markets where exports to sales ratio exceeds 15 
per cent.” 
25
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Figure 4 - Share of employment cost, Sample 2013 Figure 3 - Share of intermediate inputs cost, Sample 2013 
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Given that the distribution of shares of labour costs in Figure 4 is positively skewed (average 
of 26.58 p.p.), whilst the distribution of shares of intermediate inputs in Figure 3 is negatively 
skewed (average of 64.68 p.p.), the cost of goods sold weights heavier than nominal wages, 
for the average Portuguese firm.  
Moreover, information regarding the stock of capital and its cost of use is required to perform 
the estimation. Firstly, the growth rate of net capital accumulation is represented by Δ𝑘. Even 
though it is not common practice within the literature, in the present work the stock of capital 
considered includes both tangible and intangible assets (net of depreciations at book value). 
Opting not to include intangibles may cause results to be biased - particularly, intangibles 
tend to assume a crucial role in the accounts of firms belonging to Services
26
.  
The user cost of capital represents the cost of purchasing one unit of capital services and 
entails, simultaneously, a measure of the financial cost of capital and the depreciation rate. In 
the present paper, the user cost of capital is calculated at firm-level, using the book values 
directly reported from the firms
27
. The expression used for the user cost of capital is derived 
from Jorgenson and Hall (1967): 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
?̂? + 𝛿𝑖,𝑡)𝑃𝑡
𝐼          (9) 
where 𝑖𝑖,𝑡 represents the financial cost of capital, 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 is the depreciation rate, 𝑃𝑡
𝐼and 𝑃𝑡
?̂? 
represent the level and growth rate of investment goods price
28
, respectively.  
Using an estimate of the depreciation rate at firm-level allows capturing some of the 
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28






           (10) 
Finally, the computation of the financial cost of capital is even more meticulous. To start 
with, it is assumed that funding through equity is equivalent to funding through debt. 
Additionally, in order to avoid a considerable loss of observations, the financial cost of capital 
of firms that either reported no debt neither interest payments or  a ratio outside the [0,1] 
range was assumed to be equivalent to the average of the respective market in each year. The 




         (11) 
Moreover, Table 4 displays the average values and respective standard deviations for the 
variables used in Equation 8, in each year of the period considered
31
.   
The distribution of the financial cost of capital is positively skewed for Portuguese firms, with 
an average of approximately 6 p.p. Regarding the distribution of the depreciation rate, it is 
also positively skewed but to a smaller extent, as compared to the financial cost of capital. For 
the overall economy, the average is around 19 p.p. This figure is higher but in line with the 
ones used in similar articles. For instance, while Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) assume 
a depreciation rate of 10 per cent, Amador and Soares (2013) obtain – for the period of 2004-
2009 – precisely the same 10 per cent. Still, during a period of economic crisis and overall 
instability, more noise is expected from the data. Despite the calculation being made at the 
firm level, there is still room for potential measurement errors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29
 Note 𝐾 stands for gross capital stock 
30
 Short-term and long-term financial debt 
31
 Note there are no values for 2010 (the computation would require data from 2009) 
20 
 
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics of variables used, Portugal, Sample 
Variable 2011 2012 2013 




































                              Source: Author’s calculations – average; standard deviation in parenthesis 
6. Results 
In this section, the results from the estimation of Equation 9 are presented. Estimation is 
performed for each market and for the period 2010-2013. The benchmark case is estimated by 
OLS with clustered errors for each market. Additionally, fixed effects, random effects and 
two-step Heckman
32
 are also estimated to ensure robustness.  
As the analysis is performed at market-level, presentation of all estimates would prove to be 
extensive
33
. Therefore, all estimates presented in this Section are significant at a 10 p.p. 
confidence level. Table 5 presents the benchmark case for market 351, where β1 gives the 
                                                          
32
 Two-step Heckman procedure was used to test potential sample selection bias related with the exclusion of firms with 
negative operational profits. At a 10% significance level, the inverse Mills ratio is significant for approximately 20 percent of 
the markets. 
33
 Results may be consulted upon request 
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Table 5 – Benchmark estimates for Market 351 
Parameters Coefficient Robust Std. Error P-value 
β1 0.602 0.104 0.000 
β2 0.345 0.108 0.003 
 R2 = 0.579; F-statistic = 0.000; N = 76 
In order to trace improvements, estimates for the years 2012 and 2013 were drawn. The loss 
of two periods is due to the use of the growth rate of the depreciation rate. Hence, 
individually, only results for 2012 and 2013 can be derived. 
It would be possible to test the paradigm of perfect competition in the product market of the 
Portuguese economy here. Still, because it is widely rejected (hypothesis is rejected for over 
95 per cent
36
 of the markets), only statistically significant – at a significance level of 10 per 
cent – mark-ups are presented. For the overall economy, mark-ups range between a minimum 






Source: Author’s calculations 
                                                          
34
 351 Description: “Electric power generation, transmission and distribution” 
35
 β2 =  
∅
1−∅
, where ∅ is bargaining power. 
36
 Similar to Amador and Soares (2013) 
Figure 5 - Mark-up estimates by market, Overall Period 
Figure 6 - Correlation between market Bargaining 
Power and Mark-up, Overall Period 
22 
 
Figure 5 displays the estimates of the price-cost margins for the different regression, ranked 
by the estimates of the OLS (with clustered errors) from the highest to the lowest. It is worth 
noticing the considerable heterogeneity of mark-ups across markets, even though the rank of 
the estimates is robust to different specifications
 37
. Figure 6 displays the positive correlation 
between bargaining power and mark-up, at the market-level, thus confirming expectations of 
a potential omitted variable bias - under the assumption of a perfectly competitive labour 
market – as labour costs would incorrectly be assumed to correspond to workers’ 
productivity, hence underestimating firm’s market power
38
.  
Table 6 and 7 present, respectively, the outcome for the different types of specifications and 
the benchmark case  (OLS), depicted into smaller categories. The number of markets differs 
amongst specifications, as it only counts with estimates significant at a 10 p.p. confidence 
level, which change according to the estimation method used. 
Table 6 - Different specification results, Overall Period 
Specification Number of markets Avg. Mark-up Avg. B. Power 
OLS with clustered errors 163 26.9 16.2 
Fixed Effects 155 30.4 20.1 
Random Effects 163 27.5 17.2 
Two-step Heckman 157 26.1 17.9 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In line with the expectations, the mark-up for markets of Tradable goods is smaller than for 
the Non-Tradable. The imbalance in the state of competition between both sectors is 
considered to be the cause for an over-allocation of resources in the Non-tradable sector, 
within the recent history of the Portuguese Economy. Thus, an approximation between both 
                                                          
37
 Isolated values on the right-side of the figures represent markets from which was only possible to draw results either by 
fixed or random effects 
38
 Bassanetti et al.(2010) and Amador and Soares (2013) refer an underestimation of approximately 10 p.p. 
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by mark-ups would prove to be beneficial in regards to an efficient allocation of resources. 
Table 6 presents a breakdown by sectors of the benchmark case. The overall average mark-up 
is 26.9 p.p. compared to 26.6 p.p. estimated in Amador and Soares (2013) – suggesting no 
significant changes.  
Table 7 - OLS estimates, Overall Period 
Sectors Nº of markets Avg. Mark-up Avg. Bargaining Power 
Overall economy 163 26.9 16.2 
Manufacturing 70 26.4 17.4 
Non-manufacturing 93 27.3 15.2 
Tradable 113 26.6 16.6 
Non-tradable 50 27.6 15.1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Moreover, an average mark-up of 26.4 p.p. for Manufacturing and one of 27.3 p.p. for Non-
manufacturing, compare to 24.7 p.p. and 29.5 p.p. found in Amador and Soares (2013), 
respectively.  
For the sake of simplicity, in the present paper, we proceed to a direct analysis of critical 
markets – defined as those being intervened by product market reforms with the goal of 
fostering competition. One of the most relevant areas was related with Energy Costs – in this 
regard, liberalization measures have been put trough to allow alternatives for the end 
consumer and push prices down. From Table 8, there is evidence of a significant decrease in 
the mark-up from 2012 to 2013, which signals stronger competition. Regarding costs of 
professional and other services, there is evidence of a slight decrease. In perspective, reforms 




Table 8 – Selected Sectors, Comparison 2012-2013 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Comparing overall mark-ups of five relevant areas for 2012 and 2013, one can note positive 
improvements. From Figure 7, it is clear that only the mark-up for Transportation and Storage 
increased from one year to the other. The generic trend seems to be diminishing mark-ups, 







          Source: Author’s calculations 
7. Concluding remarks 
Concluding, the continuous monitoring of deviations from the perfect competition paradigm 
within markets is of extreme policy relevance, particularly in the case of underperforming 
economies. The methodology used in this paper proves to be practical and well customized 
for the available microeconomic data.  
 
Area 
2012 2013 Change 
Mark-up B. Power Mark-up B. Power Mark-up B. Power 
Energy Costs 71.2 33.5 50.8 13.6 -20.5 -19.9 
Cost of professional services 32.5 20.1 31.9 19.1 -0.6 -1.0 
  Cost of other services 28.0 15.5 26.7 18.8 -1.3 3.4 
Figure 5 – Selected Sectors, Mark-up evolution 2012-2013 
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Lastly, from now on, an easier and faster monitoring of market-level mark-ups is possible 
thanks to the reduction of the entry costs associated with the estimation of price-cost margins. 
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